'Linguistics and Sociolinguistics Essay\r'

'It is dif? cult to see adequately the functions of diction, beca put on it is so deeply rooted in the altogether of human behaviour that it may be pretend that there is tiny in the functional position of our conscious behaviour in which manner of singing does non play its part. Sapir (1933) lyric is a complicated business. In everyday talk, we manipulation the newsworthiness ‘ row’ in m each(prenominal)(prenominal) different counselings. It isn’t clear how ‘ lyric poem’ should be de? ned or what the person on the road hark backs it real is! We talk more or less how miraculously a child’s ‘ speech communication’ is developing solely how they defend charming ‘grammar mis retorts’, wish me maken that instead of ‘I made that’.\r\nHere, dustup is an ability that is blossoming in the child. But the word is apply in a myriad of different ways. For example, people accommodate upstanding views around how beautiful or how hideous the ‘ language’ is of some region or country or age group; how it earpieces to the ear. People show ‘I nonwithstanding adore Italian or an Irish accent. ’ They grimace or smile at adolescent talk on boob tube. Here ‘language’ is macrocosm judged aestheti bring forwardy. By contrast, we remark that you toilette’t very appreciate a culture with protrude knowing the ‘language’, as when we learn French or Japanese for that reason.\r\nThen pupils struggle with reign overs for tenses like the passe alleviate and imparfait or oblige to memorize genders and irregular verb conjugations, matters of grammar which look a million miles from cuisine, ? lm, high tech or Zen Buddhism. ‘Language’ here equates with grammar. 1 Language and society Then, people relate the word ‘language’ to the pull upion of thoughts. They often say that they ‘ feces’ t ? nd the language’ for their thoughts or express feelings. Or they be ‘hunting for the right speech communication’. Alternatively, we say that language is a substance of communication.\r\nPoliticians often use as an excuse the circumstance that their message ‘ scantily isn’t getting across’ because the media distorts what they say. In negotiations or recountingships, when communication fails, we say, ‘they just don’t speak the homogeneous language’. In another(prenominal) sensory faculty, ‘language’ appertains to a school subject. It stains sense to say that ‘little Mary is tramp in her side’, although you’d never know it when you hear her chatting with her friends. ‘Language’ is universe viewed as a luck of skills acquired in school. We atomic number 18 taught to write Standard English and spell correctly.\r\nAt the same time, we use the shape ‘languageâ⠂¬â„¢ analogically, as a metaphor. We talk of such things as ‘ eubstance language’, or the ‘languages’ of music, painting or dance. It is fairly clear that these various ordinary uses of the word refer to different aspects of language, and take different perspectives on the figure of thing language is. Or, alternatively, we do simply separate together under the heading of ‘language’ a range of diverse phenomena which atomic number 18 only partly related to each other. In order to enlighten our thoughts about language, let’s look at some of the ways language is viewed by linguists.\r\nWe can and so give a precise disceptation of the speci? cally sociolinguistic view of language, and contrast it to other views of language assumed in philology proper. The primary adopt of all linguistic scholarship is to determine the properties of congenital language, the features it has which distinguish it from any possible arti? cial language . This means that linguistics will be universalistic in its grassroots aims. It will examine unmarried native languages in the course of constructing a theory of universal grammar that explains wherefore the whole clothe of natural languages ar the way they atomic number 18.\r\nNatural languages, English, French and so on, be in circumstance the data for this theory of natural language. Arti? cial languages ar of interest too since they can exhibit sure properties any language has, further they alike have features that can sharply distinguish them from any course evolved language. philology and sociolinguistics 3 We will look at some arti? cial languages to ornament this. The linguist Noam Chomsky, in his in? uential book Syntactic Structures (1957), employed the following languages in the course of his arguments: (i) (ii) (iii) ab, aabb, aaabbb, . . .\r\nand all blames of the same type. aa, bb, abba, baab, aaaa, bbbb, aabbaa, abbbba, . . . and all sentences of the sa me type. aa, bb, abab, baba, aaaa, bbbb, aabaab, abbabb, . . . and all sentences of the same type. Why would we want to call (i), (ii) or (iii) languages? The tell is that they have certain properties of any language. They have a vocabulary of symbols, in this grounds ii letters of the alphabet ‘a’ and ‘b’. Also, they have a syntax. That is, each of the languages has speci? c die hards for connectedness together their symbols to produce the sentences or string of that language.\r\nIf the get hold of syntax is not followed, past the string or sentence produced is not a sentence of that language. ascertain the syntactic practices of the three languages. In language (i) the rule come outs to be that for each sentence, any(prenominal) the number of occurrences of the ? rst symbol, a, it is straight off followed by exactly the same number of occurrences of the warrant symbol, b. In language (ii), the rule is that, for each sentence, whatever the arr angement of a and b in the ? rst half(a) of that sentence, then that arrangement is repeated in dispel in the second half of the same sentence.\r\nI’ll leave the reader to work out the every bit simple syntax of language (iii). Note that the outturn of the application of their loveive syntactic rules to the symbols of these languages is an in? nite crabbyize of dress up up which atomic number 18 particles of the language sharply discrimin sufficient from another in? nite set of strings which are not members of the language. In brief, then, these arti? cial languages have vocabularies and syntactic rules for get together their symbols together. And, by following the rules of their syntax, an in? nite set of strings can be produced.\r\nNatural languages can alike be considered in this way. Thus, English can be viewed as a set of strings. And this in? nite set is produced by the vocabulary and syntactic rules of English. If linguists can 4 Language and society const ruct a device, a grammar, which can specify the grammatical strings of English and separate them from the combinations of symbols which are not English, they have foreg adept a considerable distance towards making verbalised the syntactic properties of the language. And if the types of rule in that\r\ngrammar are also necessary for the grammar of any natural language, then they energy have discovered some of those universal properties of language which it is the aim of linguistics to discover. Chomsky, in fact, used languages (i), (ii) and (iii) to rule out a certain class of grammars as candidates for grammars of natural language. Of course, these arti? cial languages are also extremely distant natural languages. One very noticeable engagement is that the symbols and strings don’t bear any relation to the cosmos. They have no senses or essences, but are purely syntactic.\r\nThe study of heart and how it relates symbols to the introduction is called semantics. There a re other arti? cial languages which have strings of symbols which are gistful. An example is arithmetic. mean ‘2 + 2 = 4’ or ‘3 ? 3 = 9’. These formulae have a syntax and a semantics. And they are line up, while ‘2 + 2 = 5’ is fancied. These are language-like properties. But there is also something very contrary natural language, the language spontaneously acquired by children, about these formulae. Nothing in the ball (we feel) could ever make ‘2 + 2 = 4’ false, as gigantic as the symbols themselves don’t change their meanings.\r\nThe formulae get along to be analytic or ‘always true by de? nition’. Contrast this with some sentences from natural language: 1. 2. 3. 4. Arthur is taller than Brenda. Brenda is taller than Tom. Doreen is taller than Brenda. Tom is shorter than X? We can use these sentences to make extractments which are true or false, express our doctrines that each sentence de suckerates a state of affairs in the true(a) world. These sentences are synthetic, true or false according to the facts. (Strictly speaking, it isn’t the sentences which are true or false, but the propositions which they express.\r\nA ‘sentence’ may express numerous different ‘propositions’. However, I will throw out the distinction in this book. ) We can capture a Linguistics and sociolinguistics 5 sentence’s relation with the world by giving its truth conditions. These are precisely the possible worlds †possible states of affairs †in which it is true. For example, 1 is true in worlds where the individual designated by ‘Arthur’ is a member of the class of individuals who are ‘taller than the individual designated by â€Å"Brenda” ’; otherwise it is false. Similarly, if ‘Doreen’ is also a member of that class, then 3 would be true, otherwise false.\r\n scarce if we know these truth conditions, ca n we use the sentences to state what we ourselves believe. Or understand what somebody else using the sentence is claiming to be the case. Intuitively, to know truth conditions is part of the ‘meaning’ of the sentences. But sentences also relate to each other. For example, if 1 is true, then Arthur is ‘bigger’ or ‘greater’ than Brenda with respect to her ‘height’ or her ‘tallness’. Synonymy is superstar example of sense or semantic relations. much(prenominal) semantic properties constitute inferential relationships between the sentences.\r\n some other example. We know that, if deuce Doreen and Arthur ‘are taller than’ Brenda, and Brenda ‘is taller than’ Tom, then Doreen and Arthur ‘are taller than’ Tom. We don’t have to look at the world to know this fact. It is a result of a semantic stead of the language; the ‘transitivity’ of the affirm ‘taller t han’. Similarly, ‘is shorter than’ in 4 bears a systematic semantic relation to its converse ‘is taller than’. Example 1 entails ‘Brenda is shorter than Arthur’. Entailments are inferences that depend on semantic relations.\r\nIf peerless thinks about it, this web or network of sense relations seems to suck features of the very same possible worlds in which the sentences are true. Of course it would, wouldn’t it? This is because inferential relations between sentences are just those relations where the two sentences are both true! Hence, to specify sense relations is a way to partially describe the ‘worlds’ of the truth conditions †the ones in which the sentences are true. Hence it is a way of giving the ‘meaning’ of the sentences. So far, no social factors have been mentioned. How do social factors ?\r\ngure in the explanation of language? They don’t seem directly related to either syntax o r semantics. We can begin a treatment of this doubt by mentioning a few social aspects of semantics. A fundamental factor in making both the arithmetic and natural language examples work is convention. In the ? rst case, of the 6 Language and society arithmetic symbols ‘2’, ‘4’ etc. , we have con? dence that when we use them, our addressee will understand that we intend to refer to sets of two and four, 2 and 4, etc. , respectively. This is an example of co-operative social co-ordination.\r\nIt connects the practiced [tu:] or the mark ‘2’ with any set of two things. It allows an English speaker to use the term with con? dence that their intention will be understood. The ‘sign’ and its ‘object’ have a coded relationship. Similarly with the predicates ‘is taller than’ and ‘is shorter than’. They have a coded relation with the states of affairs they re fork out. It is important to stemma that any intrinsic properties that the signs ‘2’ or ‘4’ or ‘tall’ or ‘short’ cogency have do not explain the standoff with their objects. Any noise or mark could just as easily be chosen.\r\nThis is the prop of the puckishness of the linguistic sign. Signs and objects are arbitrarily linked, by convention. And this is a social phenomenon. From a different perspective, the connection of world and words isn’t arbitrary, though it is equally social. Consider the web of inferential relations sketched above. The semantic body structure of language describes the possible worlds in which sentences are true. forthwith to even establish this structure it is necessary for us to use the signs to express belief, what we take as actually true, to coordinate ‘taller than’ and ‘shorter than’ with the world as we take it to be.\r\nIn essence, semantics de? nes possible states of the world based on our beliefs. the true has to do with ‘senses i. e. the inferential net’, the relation of ‘words and world’, and ‘our beliefs’. Without the ‘possibly true’ world set given with meanings, we couldn’t inquire, because we couldn’t think hypothetically. Without the inferential relations, we couldn’t reliably think out the consequences of our hypotheses to test them and thus be right or wrong in our beliefs, assent or disagree in the light of experience.\r\nThus, crucially, the semantic structure of a language is the very resource necessary for universe to form any empirical theory of the world and use language to inquire †to ? x belief and hence deal with everyday experience, be able to live. That the set of sentences can form a limpid theory can be seen by the fact that, if you believe that 1â€3 are true, then you can give a true solve to 4, without further looking at the world. Tom moldiness be the ‘shortest on e of all’ in this particular universe of discourse.\r\nThere is no doubt Linguistics and sociolinguistics 7 that the process of inquiry is social. We have to coordinate our beliefs and inferences for language to work. Are there other properties of natural language which require social explanation? The answer is, ‘Yes, there are legion(predicate) such properties. ’ succeeding(a) we will look at one of the most de? nitive social properties of language.\r\nThis property is called variability. Consider the English word ‘ cover’. On the levels of syntax, vocabulary and semantics, it is a atomic number 53 English item; a mass noun which means something like an edible, yellow, dairy product used in cooking and as a spread.\r\nYet although it is one item, if I asked you to describe its pronunciation in English, you would not be able to give a virtuoso answer: there are various phonetic realizations of ‘butter’. In British English authorita tive Pronunciation the t is made by put the tongue tip on the ridge behind the teeth, and releasing the air in a footling explosion without vibration of the vocal chords. The r, however, is not pronounced, although it is present in the written form. Instead, a vowel sound, shwa (phonetically transcribed as e) follows the t. The schwa is the same sound that is normally ?\r\nnal in the word sofa. Thus, the RP speaker and many other British English speakers say [bvte]. In Canadian and American accents there is a rule that when explosive sounds like t are made between two vowels, the vibration of the vocal chords, called voice, continues through the whole sequence. This has the effect of turning the [t], which is voiceless, into [d], which is its voiced counterpart. Thus, a Canadian saying ‘butter’ in fact pronounces it as if it were ‘budder’. However, Canadians and many of their American neighbours also have r-full accents (as do the Scots and Irish).\r\nT his means that, unlike the RP British English speaker, they pronounce the written r in butter, giving us the ? nal form [bvter ]. In many British English accents there is yet another variation in the pronunciation of t in this environment. The vocal chords themselves are closed tightly and then released abruptly, giving the conception that t is missing. In fact, the chap is ? lled by a socalled glottal stop, symbolized by ?. So ‘butter’ is pronounced [bv? e]. Such a pronunciation would typify London working-class speech, familiar to brotherhood Americans as a Cockney accent from ? lms like My Fair Lady. 8\r\nLanguage and society This ? lm, from George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, introduces another feature of the variability we have been describing. For prof Higgins (modelled by Shaw on the famous phonetician, Henry Sweet) to take such pains to train Eliza Doolittle to pronounce words like ‘butter’ as [bvte], as unlike to [bv? e], indicates that the variation must mean something. There is no conceptual remainder in the word-meaning itself. The meaning difference of the variation is socially signi? cant and relates to those groups in a social structure who typically use one form rather than another.\r\nSuch social meanings of variants can be further illustrated by looking at two other versions of ‘butter’. In the air jacket rural area of England there are some topical anaesthetic accents which, like Canadian and some American accents, are r-full. Speakers would typically pronounce the r in ‘butter’. And this can be combined with the use of the glottal stop to give the form [bv? er ]. On British television an advertisement promoting butter used this regional form, presumably because it had a social meaning to British audiences suggestive of honest West Country farmers genuinely in touch with real, non-synthetic cows.\r\nIn overbold York City a working-class accent will, in casual speech, be largely r-less like the British RP. But this would be combined with the voicing of the written ‘t’ between vowels giving the form [bvde]. pursuit of the 1970s Kojak detective series on television will recognize this form. Imagine, however, the different social meaning that would be conveyed if Lieutenant Kojak pronounced the word [bvder ] as might an upper-middle-class New Yorker, or [bvte] as might an upper-middle-class Englishman. It would not be the impression of the ‘tough New York cop’.\r\nThe diagram polar gives a summary of the various ways ‘butter’ can be pronounced which we have looked at. The actual situation is far more complex and kindle than I have indicated, but we will be studying this in more detail posterior in the book. The purpose here is to merely illustrate the property of variability which natural languages possess. It is clear that this property requires social explanation. This is in contrast with the arbitrary property of language mentioned earlier. In characterizing the variant forms of ‘butter’, I needed to make reference to the geographical location in which the form\r\n'